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LEGAL CULTURE BLINDNESS AND CANADIAN INDIAN LAW 
This paper will explore the special problems that specialists in federal Indian 
law in the United States face when they attempt to understand the legal position of 
indigenous peoples in Canada, make comparisons and off er assistance and advice. 
Although the roots of Canadian Indian law in British Crown policy are similar 
to those of the United States, the evolution of United States and Canadian Indian 
law occurred in patterns which were as distinctly different, as has been the evolution 
of each country. 
Although some comparisons can be made between the two patterns of legal 
development, especially in the realm of policy changes directed at indigenous 
populations, the core of each legal relationship is very different, especially as it 
relates to Federalism, the Constitutional process and role of the courts and public 
land issues. 
Therefore, while models of Indian legal achievements in one country are often 
used to induce governmental change in the other, especially in Alaska among the 
United States and in Canada, generally, advocates and United States specialists 
must exercise extreme caution to avoid legal culture blindness based on a lack of 
appreciation of the very different historical development of each nation. 
Preface 
Co-panelist Neil C. Skinner's manuscript arrived in Alaska when I was writing 
my own presentation to this conference. It so clearly and completely provided an 
assessment of the comparative status of American and Canadian definitions oflndian 
sovereignty that it caused me to begin again with a paper which, it is hoped, builds 
upon the knowledge contained in the Skinner manuscript and leads to discussion. 
Culture blindness is usually viewed as perceptions of dominant or majority 
society's members who apply them to minorities of different cultures. In this context, 
however, the culture in question about which I am writing is the dominant Canadian 
culture. American Indian law specialists cross national boundaries at their peril. 
They advise Canadian groups at their peril because Canadian Indian law is as much 
a product of the historical and political dynamics of Canada as is the American 
version a product of its own historical and political culture. 
Neither version oflndian law is especially appreciative of indigenous culture or 
the law which emerged therefrom. To the extent that either has acknowledged 
preexistent aboriginal rights or preexistent authority, it has occurred because it was 
in the best interest of that federal system. 
For purposes of this paper, I will sketch briefly some salient differences between 
the Indian law of Canada and the United States. Some of these differences appear to 
me to be more apparent than real. Further, United States Indian law as it has been 
introduced in Alaska is less different than Canadian Indian law in terms of questions 
left unresolved. The reason has more to do with the historical flow of events in each 
country than with the shared climate of Alaska and Canada. I will pose most of the 
issues not as conclusions but as points of confusion or questions. 
Roadblocks to Mutual Understanding 
Federal Indian law practitioners in the United States have, on occasion, felt 
impelled to cross national borders and offer advice to indigenous groups in Canada. 
Others may have read about current developments in Canadian Indian law or even 
found available to them the excellent Canadian Native Law Reporter in order to 
discover case reports which might be useful, persuasive citations in ongoing 
litigation in the United States. If they are lucky enough to overcome the very basic 
problem of obtaining current legal information, they confront another hurdle: how to 
relate Canadian legal information to developments in the United States. 
Interest among Alaskans has been especially high since the Honorable Thomas 
Berger chaired the Alaska Native Review Commission. Berger's roundtable sessions 
on comparative and international Indian law, his 60-plus village hearings and book, Village Journey, all suggested that models and approaches in Canada might indeed 
be preferable to those available in the United States. His commission was a working 
example of the Canadian approach. Alaska Natives and their legal representatives 
have had a keen interest in events in Canada, both historical and recent. In fact, 
among Alaskans, many correctly perceive that many parallel issues affecting 
indigenous peoples are now tabled in both Alaska, the state, and in Canada 
generally. 
For example, indigenous groups in both places are now hard at work seeking 
acknowledgment of their indigenous right to be self-governing. In both places groups 
argue that the right has never been extinguished. Concern for maintenance of 
hunting and fishing rights, both aboriginally and through legislation and treaties, is 
high in both places. Groups in each place seek to restructure governmental 
relationships with state and provincial governments. Land claims agreements have 
been sought or are being sought in each place with a great deal of concern on the 
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Canadian side that problems it associates with the original Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act are not repeated. 
Yet for all of this apparently mutual desire for transnational legal comparisons, 
there are problems in translation of developments, problems which make meaningful 
use of legal information or comprehension of events difficult. 
Some of the roadblocks to comprehension are embarrassingly elemental yet no 
less significant (e.g., parliamentary versus congressional systems). Others are fairly 
concrete. Still others are judgmental or interpretive. Most require a deeper 
appreciation of Canadian political and legal culture than most Americans possess. 
Here is a list of confusing roadblocks to comprehension for American 
practitioners. 
1. How did Canada and the United States diverge so significantly in their reading
of a root British Crown policy, the Royal Proclamation of 1763? To what extent
has the Marshall elucidation of the federal-tribal-state relationship taken hold
in Canada in the modern era?l Will it take hold?
2. Why did treaties not give rise to a judicial reading of sovereignty on the part of
the treating parties? Is the better view that whatever the status of tribes who
made treaties, later legislative response to indigenous needs had an
extinguishing impact on their preexistent governmental authority?
3. How comparable are federal-provincial relationships to federal-state
relationships when matters of Indian legal rights are considered? (Hogg,
1985:557-560) How did the protracted historical regional integration affect this
subject? How does public land policy affect this subject? How did the
Constitution Act of 1982 and the later Meech Lake Accord affect the scope of
federal action in the provinces and in the territories?
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4. To what extent are the territories in a better or worse position to accomplishadvances for aboriginal peoples than the provinces? To what extent does theterritorial experience mirror the early and later Alaska experience for AlaskaNatives?5. Does the newly enunciated constitutional position of Canadian indigenouspeoples and their existing aboriginal rights and treaties afford them aconstitutional position superior to that of American Indian tribes in the UnitedStates?6. Does the relative absence of tribal courts or other instruments of tribalgovernment on Canadian Indian reserves hurt or advance their prospects ofself-government when compared with United States Indians and, especially,with Alaska Natives?7. How are Canadian land claims different from American couterparts givensimilar economic forces and dissimilar political forces? How comprehensive arethese claims likely to be?8. How did Metis and non-status Indians secure a role in the Indian legal process(and even constitutional entrenchment in the case of the Metis) whendetribalized Indians in the United States disappear from the screen whenmatters of Indian law and policy are considered unless they move back toreservations or enter lengthy processes to secure federal recognition?Baseline Similarities British Crown policy rooted in international law and diplomacy set in motion the same policy for dealing with Indian tribes in both countries. That policy specified that the Crown had exclusive authority to extinguish aboriginal title and to receive Indian lands. The policy was rearticulated in early American supreme court cases - 3 -
establishing in law (if not in fact) what Charles Wilkinson has termed a third order of 
government with federal, tribal and state components (Wilkinson, 1982). 
The momentum of British policy had been dictated by the flow of international 
events as the Crown sought to form alliances and avoid direct conflict with tribes. 
The momentum of American policy appears to have dictated by the pressures on the 
national government to take to itself the national land base and to transform it into 
new territories and states through a process of guided settlement. 
History 
In Canada a different momentum appeared, built on different legal premises. 
Treaties were made, but aboriginal title was neither acknowledged nor extinguished. 
In the Western provinces this process occurred independently and prior to 
confederation. Indigenous governments were dealt with but not explicitly 
acknowledged as possessed of inherent tribal authority. 
Clearly the differing pressures for frontier settlement were influential here. So, 
also, was the time lag on confederation (and ultimate repatriation) of Canada 2.
To my mind, the most significant difference in the development oflndian policy 
m each country was the difference between public land policy in each place, 
specifically the ultimate role of federal or state (provincial) government in 
management of natural resources. 
In the United States tribal ownership and governorship of land was useful to 
the United States in receiving and allocating public lands. In Canada Crown land 
came to belong to individual provinces subject only to an Indian interest in land. 
Only in the territories did there appear to be a situation relatively parallel to the 
American situation and one especially parallel to Alaska. There governance was 
primarily out of Ottawa and there land remained Crown land in the Crown. 
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Government 
The Canadian government employed the Indian Act to establish delegated and 
municipal-type governments on Indian reserves. Although the Act has been 
amended in modern times to allow for more Indian autonomy, it is clearly not based 
upon any premise of preexistent tribal sovereignty. Provincial law applies where not 
displaced or contrary to treaty rights or provisions of the Indian Act. To the contrary 
in the United States, it is left to the Congress to remove from tribes their powers of 
self-government or to delegate new ones. State jurisdiction is subject to this 
infringement and preemptive process. 
The building blocks of federal Indian law in the United States, established early 
in its history, include aboriginal title, inherent right to self-government and the 
established place of Indian tribes in the American system as domestic dependent 
nations subject to the ultimate will of Congress (Skinner, 1989:5-10). Canadian 
jurisprudence began a process of discovery of these elements in the twentieth century, 
again with the primary focus on the still federal territories and western provinces 
where the position was that Indian claims were an exclusively federal responsibility. 
Alaska in the United States remained a domain where these Indian rights were 
less clearly articulated by the Congress and the courts. No treaties had been signed. 
It remained for cases after the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 to 
confirm that an aboriginal title had in fact been extinguished to land as well as 
hunting and fishing rights. The scope and jurisdiction of indigenous government 
remains a matter of litigation. Alaska Natives have developed their strongest and 
most successful arguments where Congress has explicitly granted legislative 
exceptions and preferences to Natives and their communities (Conn, 1987). Yet the 
picture is so unclear that federal courts are now requesting that Alaska Native 
villages prove their historical and continuing tribal existence as a prelude to 
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confirmation of their tribal authority, a judicial test never employed where Congress 
has explicitly recognized a predominantly Indian (or "Native") group. So in Alaska 
as in Canada there has been a severence of discovered and extinguished aboriginal 
land title from acknowledgment of inherent tribal organizations. 
Treaties 
Both nations pursued treaty policies. Treaties continued to be the mainstay of 
Indian policy in Canada well beyond the Congressional cutoff date in 1871. Both 
countries left most Northern peoples without treaties perhaps bcause no state, 
provincial or settlement pressure for public land control existed. Breakdowns in 
implementation of treaties generated a claims process in the United States and a 
land claims process in Canada. In the former monetary awards were the usual 
outcome. In the latter a combination of land and monetary awards appears more 
typical. 
American lawyers are bemused by the fact that this attenuated treaty process 
did not confirm a preexistent governmental status on tribes. 
Courts have long held that Congress can unilaterally extinguish treaty rights 
subject only to Fifth Amendment claims. Treaty rights have been abrogated in 
Canada through general and specific legislation. Yet this process may well be 
suspended by the entrenchment of treaties within the Canadian constitution. 
Courts in both countries appear to apply sympathetic rules of construction to 
Indian litigants when treaties are interpreted or weighed against legislation which 
may override them. 
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Aboriginal Title 
The often-related struggle of Canadian indigenous people to confirm in the 
court that they were possessed of aboriginal title, which may or may not have been 
extinguished, occupies much of the Canadian Indian law literature. It is also the 
focal point of current litigation in British Columbia and elsewhere. 
Whether indigenous people enjoy traditional or common law rights to their land 
matters to Indian advocates. As Bryan Kean-Cohen and Bradford Morse put it: 
The answer provided by the courts is critical: it makes the difference 
between asserting and protecting "land rights" as a legal right and, if 
appropriate, demanding compensation for dispossession (USA), or having 
to accept such rights as are offered by government with no ability to 
protect them (Canada and Australia). 
(Kean-Cohen and Morse, 1984:74-98 at 83.) 
Because aboriginal title once discovered or suggested places some burden on the 
federal government to protect it and to extinguish it so that the Indian interest is 
removed, it is a powerful lever on the legal and political process. The Canadian 
Berger inquiry cast such a shadow on the Northern gasline route3. The Malouf 
interim injunction placed such a burden on the James Bay hydroelectric project. The 
Minto injunction against construction of the Alyeska TransAlaska Pipeline had a 
similar impact. In each case, the possibility of protracted legal arguments caused 
negotiations to grind forward sufficient to resolve the claims enunciated (or, as in the 
case of the Canadian gas line, gave its opponents the edge necessary to cancel the 
project). This suggests that a preliminary demonstration of legal rights coupled with 
good reasons to move to rapid settlement of those rights, such as major developmental 
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projects, facilitate negotiations in each country, drawing into those negotiations 
reluctant provinces (or states) as well as the federal government. 
Canadian indigenous organizations have sought to negotiate an entrenchment 
of their rights into their written Canadian constitution. They secured seats at the 
negotiation sessions. Yet they did not secure explicit acknowledgment of aboriginal 
rights of self-government. Instead, they secured entrenchment of aboriginal rights 
left undefined as well as treaty and land claims rights. They also secured 
constitutional acknowledgment of each aboriginal group, including the Metis who are 
without recognized treaties or land base. 
The Constitutional Question 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that "the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights are hereby recognized and affirmed. Aboriginal peoples 
are specifically identified as 'Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada."' 
To this was added "(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) 'treaty rights' 
includes rights that now exist by way of land rights agreements or may be so 
acquired." 
Section 25 of the Constitution Act provides that the "guarantee in this Charter 
of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate 
from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada including: 
a. any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation
of October 7, 1763; and 
b. any rights or freedoms that (may have been acquired by the original peoples
by way of land claims settlements) 'that now exist by way of land claims agreements 
or may be so acquired."' 
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To an outsider, this expression of aboriginal rights as a kind of higher law is 
remarkable and enviable. Yet the meaning of these provisions and specifically the 
manner in which Canada's high court will undertake its constitutional interpretation 
of them when confronted with claims of aboriginal rights or rights case in treaties or 
claims settlements which are in conflict with past or future statutory law remains the 
subject of intense debate (See Pentney, 1987). 
This debate was anticipated by provinces when the Section 35 was withdrawn 
and resubmitted with "existing" included. It was anticipated when the March 16, 
1983 amendments included entrenchment of future land claims agreements. What 
rights are constitutional and not subject to unilateral limitation by federal or 
provincial legislatures? 
Many analyses have been done by legal scholars in Canada. Slattery (1985) 
suggests that Section 35 will protect both rights ascertained on its date of passage 
and rights acquired through modern land claims settlement (1985:127). Aboriginal 
rights may evolve or be modified through explicit agreement (Id.). 
Such an interpretation would offer a marked improvement over United States 
Indian law where unilateral modification of preexisting rights can be accomplished 
by the Congress under its constitutional plenary authority. 
Yet there is another aspect of this constitutional entrenchment which bodes less 
well for Canadian aboriginals. The rights protected must have an existing basis and 
have not previously been extinguished by operation of Canadian law. 
The core of future litigation in Canada will be the extent to which previously 
enacted statutes have modified what advocates for aboriginal peoples term "existing 
rights." Here distinctions will likely be drawn between reasonable efforts at 
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government regulation and specific attempts to suppress Native rights. Mere failure 
to implement or observe a right may not be viewed as its extinguishment. 
What statutes passed to fulfill the Crown's trust responsibility as enunciated 
preliminarily in Guerin (Skinner, 1989:12-13) effectively extinguished aboriginal 
rights.4 Specifically, did the Indian Act with its Section 88 proviso that permits 
provincial laws of general application to apply to Indians effectively extinguish 
existing rights of aboriginal self-government? Or could advocates now argue that at 
least some of these acts have a specially severe effect on Indians by impairing their 
status or capacity? (See Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen (1978) S.C.R. 104, 110.) 
The picture that emerges is one of confusion and expectation. As with the 
matter of land rights and aboriginal title, the potential for a high court reading which 
negates an existing or future statute as unconstitutional is balanced by another 
possibility: that the high court will review the comprehensive legislative field which 
the federal government and provinces have constructed as entirely appropriate under 
its earlier authority (Sec. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867), appropriate to the 
status of dependency of aboriginal peoples and Crown responsibility. 
The uncertainby drives both aboriginal groups and government officials toward 
negotiation since most commentators continue to view the historical process of 
voluntary cession of rights, even constitutionally entrenched, as appropriate. One 
can further assume that future litigation will focus on the content of that negotiation 
and the adequacy of representation of aboriginal peoples. This latter element can be 
confusing for non-status Indians and for Metis who are constitutionally 
acknowledged as aboriginal peoples (See Morse and Groves, 1986:139-167). 
Alaska Natives have sought a resolution of remaining indigenous rights 
questions from the Congress. While the Congress has amended their land claims 
settlement act to protect undeveloped land from a wide variety of legal consequences 
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which have historically diminished tribal land bases in the lower 48, the same 1988 
amendment professed absolute neutrality on matters of critical importance to 
Natives, especially the scope and authority of tribal jurisdiction. 
Tribal Self-Government 
Skinner has written about the first major difference between U.S. and 
Canadian Indian policy. From an early moment American courts have acknowledged 
an inherent right of self-government on the part of American tribes such that these 
tribes could be said to hold aboriginal title to their lands, cede that title unilaterally 
to the federal government and handle other matters of civil and criminal authority 
not removed explicitly or by implication by the American Congress. Canadian Indian 
law did not confirm an aboriginal right to self-government in the groups whose 
aboriginal title it extinguished and in the tribes with which it treated, even when it 
was a prerequisite to a finding of aboriginal title. (See Hamlet of Baker Lake v .  Minister of Indian Affairs (1979), 107 D.L.R (3d) 513.) 
Until the last decade its high court interpreted Indian rights as rooted in their 
articulation through the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Constitution Act of 
1867 which gave the federal government jurisdiction over "Indians and Lands 
reserved for Indians." The Indian Act defined membership, and a municipal-style 
reserve regime allowing provincial law to fill in all areas not governed by parliament. 
As stated, treaty-making continued in Canada far beyond the 1871 end of 
treaty-making in the United States. The logic of treaty-making - that it occurs 
between sovereigns - was not fully appreciated in Canadian courts. The doctrine that 
treaty rights could not be in and of themselves made subject to assertion without 
parliamentary implementation and could, in fact, be overridden by general 
legislation held sway until recent years. 
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However, the demise of this point of view with an increasing judicial eye toward 
specific extinguishment of treaty rights and implied Native rights by legislation has 
occurred in Canada when a new opportunity for discovery of unextinguished 
aboriginal rights emerged with the Constitutional Amendment Proclamation of 
1984. 
Section 35 of the Constitutional Act entrenches existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights. Section 25 protects indigenous rights against the general provisions of the 
Aboriginal Rights and Freedoms. But with the failure of indigenous peoples to secure 
further amendments or entrenchment of aboriginal rights to self-government 
through direct participation in a series of First Minister's Conferences on aboriginal 
constitutional issues, questions remain. They include the extent to which past 
federal or even provincial legislative override has extinguished historical aboriginal 
rights including that of self-government. Further, if past or future land claims 
agreements are afforded constitutional status and superiority over mere legislation, 
will they include rights of self-government at least related to management of the 
land? 
The struggle for aboriginal self-government in Canada began without an 
articulated governmental theory of domestic dependent sovereignty. Yet in the late 
twentieth century, one could argue that its legal prospects are bright and even 
brighter than those of United States Indian tribes. Policy shifts toward 
acknowledgment of self-determination have been accompanied by favorable decisions 
related to aboriginal land title, premised upon indigenous groups engaged in 
governmental control of their territory. Amendments to the Indian Act have 
strengthened group control over membership. The Penner commission called for the 
right of tribes to negotiate with federal and provincial governments over further 
powers of self-government and this formula found its way into legislation 
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implementing the James Bay Agreement and calls for comprehensive land claims 
settlements. 
While the basic rearrangement of power between the federal and provincial 
governments has momentarily derailed original constitutional strategies of 
territorial groups, the path toward negotiation of complementary powers of self­
government seems to have been opened. 
To American Indian law lawyers, the level of governing authority of Indian Act 
bands may seem on its fact embarrassingly inferior to that of American Indian tribes. 
Such an analysis that compares that nation's current posture with an ideal vision of 
tribal sovereignty in the United States is unfair. Case law in the United States has 
long confirmed the capacity of the Congress to unilaterally remove tribal authority 
and to give it over to either itself or to the surrounding states. There has been some 
reluctance on the court's part to infer from acts of Congress a desire to limit tribal 
authority within established reservation boundaries. However, in other areas of 
tribal law enforcement over non-Indians, in criminal cases or where (as in liquor 
regulation) white protection has been a paternalistic mainstay of state and federal 
policies, the court has suggested that the flow of historical events has sharply 
diminished the potential operation of tribal governments unless Congress confirms 
this authority or delegates it to them anew because of their dependent status. 
Indian groups on both sides of the border decry tribal sovereignty when it is 
based upon municipal powers of government delegated from a second sovereign. If 
delegated through statute, it can be removed or revised and is not inherent. Yet as a 
practical matter, most tribal sovereignty in the United States is entirely dependent 
on subject-specific legislation and external federal subsidies. 
The recent reductions in appropriations through the Indian Self-determination 
Act and the policy base upon which the Act was constructed are more suggestive of a 
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Canadian model of delegation (or devaluation) of responsibility than the professed 
American legal model. Indian self-determination required administration of 
programs by Indians on the terms established by the federal government. It created 
for many tribes a shadow Bureau oflndian Affairs, a rather classic pattern of colonial 
devolution or indirect rule. Appropriations and strings attached to those 
appropriations have made a mockery of tribal self-government. 
In both Canada and in the United States it is likely that statutorily defined and 
negotiated realms of autonomy for indigenous groups will be the norm and not the 
exception. For the practitioner, then, the issue becomes one of deciding in which 
country would one desire to be carrying out negotiations. Canadian court cases now 
seem to be moving toward recognition of unextinguished aboriginal title even in the 
most adamantly hostile Western provinces. Tripartite negotiations within the 
provinces and bilateral territorial negotiations (with strong provincial presence, 
thanks to Meech Lake) seems to be the anticipated norm. In the United States the 
process of developing tribal-state compacts as a furtherance of tribal government is 
active in certain areas (child welfare and environment) but less active in most others. 
Tribes defer from using taxing authority, authority they possess on paper, because of 
the likely impact on reservation development and a fundamental scarcity of legal 
resources to meet state or corporate challenges. 
Land Claims 
Modern land claims in Canada are strikingly different from the Alaska 
Settlement, at least at first blush. Land title is communal and protected. Critical 
attention is paid to traditional hunting and fishing grounds. Some legal authority to 
continue use of these grounds is usually included in settlements. Subsurface estates 
may be retained by the Crown. 
- 1 4  -
Settlements may be constitutionally entrenched although the question is still 
debated as to whether or not amendments to the settlement are legislative or require 
constitutional amendment. 
Differences in many settlements also appear. Settlements with the Crown 
within provinces were not easily made from Crown land because public land is held 
by the provinces. Unless there is some duality of interests between provinces and the 
Crown, the Crown must carry on separate negotiations with provinces to free up 
settlement land bases other than reserves (Hogg, 1985:555). 
Territories and Self-Government: Comprehensive Claims 
Negotiations with indigenous groups in the Northwest territory were, for a 
time, relatively free of provincial interference. Land claims settlements were coupled 
with political aspirations of the Dene and Inuit peoples. Both anticipated that they 
would emerge as indigenous provinces capable of territorial control and self­
governing authority. Indian and Eskimo peoples assumed that after some trade off of 
the resource wealth to the provinces, they could protect their voting power with 
durational residency requirements. 
These heady aspirations flowed from expectations that their secured right of 
involvement in constitutional negotiations would lead to further entrenchment of 
land rights including powers of self-government. Dene and Inuit were also optimistic 
because of the limited veto power of the antagonistic Western provinces. 
The Meech Lake Accord of 198 7 and Constitution Amendment, 198 7, had many 
impacts on Canadian federalism. Yet the most significant was the shift in veto power 
accorded to single provinces, on admission of new provinces. This, coupled with the 
end of the mandated constitutional discussions, suggests that the balance of power 
has shifted away from heady territorial aspirations of land with self-government. 
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The recent land claims agreement in the territory which protected Crown 
subsoil interests to mineral resources and spoke of future discussions on government 
are indicative of this weakening of the indigenous position. 
Self-government on Indian reserves has always been marked by severe 
constraints. Provincial civil and criminal law applied unless Crown legislation 
overrode it, a near reversal of the judicial doctrine impacting Indian reservations in 
the United States. Agreements struck in recent years with Indian bands granted 
them municipal or delegated tribal authority. A question left for the courts is the 
extent to which indigenous groups have indigenous or inherent authority and the 
futher extent to which that power has been extinguished by the Indian Act and other 
legislative accords between the Crown and the Provinces. 
Evaluation of Comparisons - Which Comparisons? 
First it must be made clear that the comparisons made here are not between two 
models, but three or even four. Alaska Natives signed no treaties. Congress had 
banned treaties with Indians four years after the Alaska purchase. That Alaska 
remained a federal territory gave the federal government enormous leverage over 
definition of Indian land, government and resources at least until statehood in 1959 
and even later due to the large federal land base in the state and the state's desire to 
have land rights resolved so that it could select its own share of that land base and 
manage resouces on all public lands. 
Land settlements in Alaska were defined and redefined with issues of tribal 
self-governmental authority explicitly left for judicial determination. Aboriginal 
hunting and fishing rights were extinguished and replaced with statutory schemes 
that provided for rural preferences as a condition of state public land management. 
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The Alaska situation is, then, less clearly defined than that of the rest of the 
United States when Indian law is concerned. Part of the reason is the long territorial 
history of the place and the continuing hold by the United States over much of Alaska 
land and resources. One is tempted to set the Alaska scenario up as at least a third 
model just as one is tempted to see in Canada two models, a provincial and a 
territorial model. 
While there are explicit differences in the black letter doctrine of Canadian 
Indian law and United States Indian law, when one examines the disputes in each 
place, it may be fair to say that the differences are more apparent than real. 
In both places the role of provinces and states in asserting their authority over 
indigenous people is strong. This strength is clear in Canada, obviated only by the 
entrenchment of existing aboriginal rights treaties and land claims agreements. In 
the case of organized states in the United States it is officially weak, subject to the 
whims of Congressional edict. Yet some would argue that the evolving judicial 
doctrine which once was prepared to view Native sovereignty as the rule with 
selective exceptions carved out by Congress, has now become reluctant to read into 
inherent sovereignty new forms of governmental authority unless explicitly 
recognized (and delegated) by acts of Congress. There seems to have emerged a 
presumption that state legal authority has been granted over Indian tribes where 
Congress has not acted. Put another way, tribes in the United States and Alaska 
seek support for Congressional acknowledgment of their authority which, to 
Canadian eyes, might seem to be no more than delegated authority. 
Land claims models in the lower 48 embody the concept of trust responsibility 
by the federal government to a communal title. Although shifts in policy under the 
mandate of self-determination seem to have given tribes effective control and 
protection of their land, tribal exploitation of resources has been fraught with 
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unfairly negotiated contracts and scant rewards. Leasing policies and other federally 
manged programs have left indigenous groups impoverished, their land strip-mined 
and valueless. 
While the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act did not create tribal land bases 
but corporate land holdings, amendments to the Act have added many legal 
protections to the undeveloped land base. Ownership of the corporations will not 
shift until stockholders vote to alienate their stock (with certain geographic 
exceptions). 
As I ponder the differences in legal reference frames I am struck by the impact 
of nonlegal forces which tend to make the Canadian and (at least) Alaskan models 
very similar. 
Neither model protects indigenous groups from competing economic forces 
which favor limited indigenous control of resources unless the indigenous groups are 
prepared to cooperate in resource development. Indigenous groups in both places 
must be prepared to broker their control over resources, be it absolute or secondary, 
to receive or retain access to subsistence resources and local political control. 
Whether that political authority is viewed as inherent or delegated, it is extremely 
limited and in no sense of the word co-equal with provincial or state authority, 
especially as it impacts non-group members. 
The fulcrum of Indian policy in both countries appears to be the struggle 
between states and provinces with the federal government over natural resources. 
States and provinces are prepared to allow relative indigenous autonomy when the 
federal government foots the bill and when their own access to public resources 
development is enhanced. 
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The importance of constitutional entrenchment of existing aboriginal rights is 
perhaps the high water mark of Canadian indigenous rights, and inherent tribal 
authority over a tribal land base, the high water mark of United States Indian policy. 
Each pales when the conceptual rights are played off against the struggle between 
federal and provincial forces for power. The indigenous groups can become co-actors 
only to the extent they can leverage some authority from either side; their power is 
derivative of two other powerful actors and not co-equal. 
None of this suggests that indigenous groups are non-players. The skill that 
their advocates can employ to manipulate the ongoing struggles between provinces 
and the federal government will determine the relative strength of Indian rights in 
each place. 
The key to success in crossing national boundaries as an actor in matters of 
indigenous rights may be less an appreciation of black letter law on the other side (or 
comparative Indian law) than an appreciation of the role of law within the political 
process on the other side or, more broadly, the power relationship5 between provinces 
and Ottawa or the states and Washington, D.C .. 
Thus, the American lawyer who advises Canadian groups to press for inherent 
sovereignty or the Canadian jurist who presses for change through a commission 
because each strategy has worked in his Native land, may be ignoring the political 
landscape in which he is working - to the detriment of his Native client. 
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Footnotes 
1. Slattery (1985) writes:
What we lack is a proper understanding of when and how the native peoples of
Canada were won to the allegiance of the crown and what effect this process had
on their original land rights, customary laws, and systems of government. Did
the crown gain sovereignty over Canada with or without the consent of the
aboriginal peoples? On what terms was it achieved? Did native groups come to
occupy the same status as other Canadian subjects, or did they have some
special relationship with the crown? It is a remarkable fact that coherent
answers to these questions cannot be found in standard treatises on Canadian
constitutional law and history, or even in more specialized works. (at 116)
2. At Confederation the federal government was granted in s91(24) of the British
North America Act (now the Constitution Act 1867) exclusive jurisdiction over
'Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians,' with the original four provinces
receiving control over natural resources, property and civil rights subject to the
burden of aboriginal title where it continued to exist. The Prairie provinces
received control over natural resources only in 1930, while the remainder were
former colonies of Great Britain which entered Canada after 1867 after
negotiating their own terms of union. With the expansion of Canada west and
northward, Indian treaties were obtained and a series of lndian Acts were
developed, both largely on models elaborated in the Canadas (Quebec and
Ontario) in the 1850s. Thus the conditions and objectives that obtained in
central Canada were tranferred to the national level.
(Morse and Groves, 1987, at 142-143.)
3. See Thomas Berger, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland, The Report of the
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (1977).
4. Guerin v. R (1985) 13 DLR (4th) 390,400. Sanders (1987) writes on Guerin (at
186)):
The fiduciary obligation of the Government of Canada arose because of the pre­
existing Indian rights. Indian rights and the Crown's fiduciary obligation were
confirmed, not created, by the provisions of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and
the Indian Act.
Remarkable as it may seem, the Guerin decision is the first clear Canadian
decision that Indian rights arise out of the pre-existing indigenous legal order,
and not from some common law doctrine of aboriginal title or by virtue of an
affirming action by the colonial legal system.
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